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OPINION 
________________ 
 
Smith, Circuit Judge. 
Jose Juan Chavez-Alvarez petitions the Court for 
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), which affirmed the determination of the Immigration 
Judge (IJ) that Chavez-Alvarez is subject to removal under 
Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 101(a)(43)(F) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1101(a)(43)(F), as an alien who has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony.  Chavez-Alvarez also 
petitions for review of the pretermission of his application for 
a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to Section 212(h) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).1  For the reasons that follow, we 
will grant Chavez-Alvarez’s petition and remand to the BIA. 
I. 
Chavez-Alvarez is a citizen of Mexico who entered the 
United States at the age of two without admission or parole.  
On September 30, 1989, Chavez-Alvarez adjusted his status 
and became a lawful permanent resident.  From June 27, 1991 
through January 30, 2004, Chavez-Alvarez served in the 
United States Army.  After his first entry into the United 
States, Chavez-Alvarez has only departed the United States in 
his capacity as a member of the Army. 
During the night of August 11, 2000 and early the 
following morning, Chavez-Alvarez had nonconsensual 
sexual contact with a female platoon member.  As provided in 
the Stipulation of Fact from Chavez-Alvarez’s court-martial, 
Chavez-Alvarez was drinking alcohol with his platoon 
                                              
1 Chavez-Alvarez also challenges the IJ’s conclusion 
that he is removable based on having been convicted of two 
crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from the same 
scheme of criminal conduct.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  As the BIA did not address this issue, it 
is not properly raised in this appeal and the BIA should 
consider the issue in the first instance, if necessary.   
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members at a bar outside of the army base in Tongduchon, 
Korea.  Chavez-Alvarez escorted a visibly intoxicated female 
platoon member back to the army base; the female platoon 
member was unable to walk on her own.  Chavez-Alvarez 
assisted the woman back to her bedroom and began helping 
her change out of her clothing.  During this time, the woman 
vomited between six to eight times and eventually lay 
unconscious on her bed.  Despite being aware that she was 
unable to give consent due to her incapacitation, Chavez-
Alvarez began to touch her genitals, including performing 
oral sex on her.  She began to protest, but Chavez-Alvarez 
believed her movement indicated consent.  He then had 
sexual intercourse with the woman.  
In the early morning of August 12, 2000, Chavez-
Alvarez provided a signed statement to the Criminal 
Investigation Division of the United States Army denying that 
he had engaged in sexual contact with the female platoon 
member.  In a written statement about one hour later, Chavez-
Alvarez again denied such sexual contact.  Chavez-Alvarez 
was aware that both statements were false.   
On September 6, 2000, Chavez-Alvarez was charged 
with violating four articles in the congressionally-enacted 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): Article 107, 10 
U.S.C. § 907, for two specifications2 (i.e., counts) of making 
                                              
2 “A specification is a plain, concise, and definite 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.  A specification is sufficient if it alleges every 
element of the charged offense expressly or by necessary 
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false official statements; Article 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920, for 
rape; Article 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925, for sodomy; and, 
Article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934, for two specifications of 
violating the general article.3  On December 12, 2000, 
Chavez-Alvarez pleaded guilty to violating five of the 
charged specifications (all of the specifications except for 
rape).  The military judge sentenced Chavez-Alvarez as 
follows: “To be discharged from the service with a bad-
conduct discharge, to be reduced to the grade of E-1, and to 
be confined for a period of 18 months.”  App’x 70.  Chavez-
Alvarez’s sentence did not apportion the 18-month 
confinement between the five specifications or the three 
articles to which he pleaded.   
On June 5, 2012, approximately ten years after 
Chavez-Alvarez completed his confinement, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) agents arrested Chavez-Alvarez 
                                                                                                     
implication.  No particular format is required.”  Rules for 
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 307(c)(3), Manual for Courts-
Martial, II-28, 29 (2000 ed.).  Each specification “[s]tates 
only one offense” and “[c]harges and specifications alleging 
all known offenses by an accused” may be brought at one 
time.  R.C.M 307(c)(4), Manual for Courts-Martial, II-29.   
3 Article 134 (the general article), punishes a person 
subject to the UCMJ for, inter alia, “all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon 
the armed forces.”  10 U.S.C. § 934; see Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 733 (1974). 
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at his home in New Freedom, Pennsylvania.  DHS charged 
Chavez-Alvarez with being removable pursuant to 
Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA as 
having been convicted of an aggravated felony for 
committing a “crime of violence.”  8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16).  
On June 29, 2012, DHS also charged Chavez-Alvarez with 
being removable based on Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as having been convicted 
of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising 
out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.  DHS has 
detained Chavez-Alvarez pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 
without a bond hearing since June 5, 2012.4 
On November 1, 2012, the IJ concluded that Chavez-
Alvarez was removable on both grounds.  On March 5, 2013, 
the IJ also concluded that Chavez-Alvarez was not eligible to 
apply for a waiver under Section 212(h) of the INA and 
entered an order of removal.  Chavez-Alvarez timely 
appealed to the BIA, which issued a precedential opinion on 
March 14, 2014 affirming the order of removal based on 
Chavez-Alvarez having an aggravated felony conviction and 
not being eligible for a Section 212(h) waiver.  Chavez-
Alvarez timely filed a petition for review.  This Court issued 
a stay of removal pending the outcome of these proceedings. 
                                              
4 Chavez-Alvarez separately filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus challenging his detainment.  See Chavez-
Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prisons, No. 14-1402, 2015 
WL 1567019, --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2015). 
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II. 
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1).  Because the basis for removal is Chavez-
Alvarez’s conviction for an aggravated felony, we review the 
BIA’s ruling under Section 242(a)(2)(C)-(D) of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D), for “constitutional claims and 
questions of law.”  Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 
1082 (3d Cir. 2014).  Whether an alien’s offense constitutes 
an aggravated felony is “a purely legal question.”  Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review 
legal challenges de novo.  Id.  “When the BIA issues its own 
decision on the merits, rather than a summary affirmance, we 
review its decision, not that of the IJ.”  Syblis v. Att’y Gen., 
763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pieschacon-
Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  We may consider the 
opinion of the IJ “only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.”  
Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  An aggravated felony is defined as, inter 
alia, “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 
18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the 
term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).  The government bears “the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence” that an alien 
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has committed an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 
(2009).  Chavez-Alvarez argues that he was not convicted of 
an aggravated felony because he was neither convicted of a 
crime of violence nor received a sentence for which the term 
of imprisonment was at least one year.  
  The BIA found Chavez-Alvarez removable based on 
his general court-martial5 conviction for committing sodomy 
in violation of Article 125 of the UCMJ, which, at the time of 
his conviction, provided: 
                                              
5 There are three kinds of courts-martial in the armed 
forces: general courts-martial, special courts-martial, and 
summary courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 816.  General courts-
martial may consist of either: 
(A) a military judge and not less than five 
members or, in a case in which the accused may 
be sentenced to a penalty of death, the number of 
members determined under section 825a of this 
title (article 25a); or 
(B) only a military judge, if before the court is 
assembled the accused, knowing the identity of 
the military judge and after consultation with 
defense counsel, requests orally on the record or 
in writing a court composed only of a military 
judge and the military judge approves. 
10 U.S.C. § 816(1).  Chavez-Alvarez’s general court-martial 
consisted of only a military judge.  
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(a) Any person subject to this chapter who 
engages in unnatural carnal copulation with 
another person of the same or opposite sex or 
with an animal is guilty of sodomy.  Penetration, 
however slight, is sufficient to complete the 
offense. 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall by 
punished as a court-martial may direct. 
10 U.S.C. § 925 (1956).6 
After the military judge accepted Chavez-Alvarez’s 
guilty plea as to violating the five specifications, which 
included the sodomy charge, the military judge issued a 
general (or gross) sentence requiring Chavez-Alvarez “to be 
                                              
6 All references to Article 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925, in this 
opinion are to the 1956 version of the statute that was in 
effect at the time Chavez-Alvarez committed the offense.  
Article 125 has since been amended, and effective December 
26, 2013, the statute now only prohibits sodomy committed 
by force or without consent of the other person: 
 (a) Forcible sodomy.—Any person subject to 
this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal 
copulation with another person of the same or 
opposite sex by force or without the consent of 
the other person is guilty of forcible sodomy and 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.   
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2013).  
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confined for a period of 18 months.”  Thus, the sentence 
issued by the military judge in Chavez-Alvarez’s general 
court-martial was not apportioned between the five offenses 
for which Chavez-Alvarez was convicted. 
The maximum punishments for these articles of the 
UCMJ, as prescribed by the Manual for Courts-Martial,7 are 
as follows: 
Article 107 (False official statements): 
“dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, and confinement for 5 years.”  Art. 
107, Manual for Courts-Martial, IV-46–47. 
Article 125 (Sodomy): “(1) By force and without 
consent.  Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for life.”  
Art. 125, Manual for Courts-Martial, IV-79. 
Article 134 (Assault—indecent): “Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years.” Art. 134, Manual 
for Courts-Martial, IV-97. 
Article 134 (Adultery): “Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year.” Art. 134, Manual for 
                                              
7 All citations to the Manual for Courts-Martial are to 
the 2000 edition, the edition in effect at the time of Chavez-
Alvarez’s general court-martial.  
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Courts-Martial, IV-96–97. 
Chavez-Alvarez’s 18-month sentence, therefore, was below 
the maximum punishment for all but one of his convictions 
(the general article adultery conviction).   
In this case, whether the statute of conviction, 10 
U.S.C. § 925 (Article 125 of the UCMJ), contains all the 
elements of a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 is a 
question we need not reach.8  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 
                                              
8 In addition, we need not reach Chavez-Alvarez’s 
argument regarding the availability of a Section 212(h) 
waiver for an alien subject to removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  
On remand, the BIA may conclude that Chavez-Alvarez is no 
longer subject to removal, at which point this issue would be 
moot.  And even if Chavez-Alvarez is removable based on 
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as having been convicted of two or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single 
scheme of criminal misconduct, the legal basis for any relief 
from removal that Chavez-Alvarez may seek would be based 
on arguments not presently before us.  Thus, despite the fact 
that several of our sister courts of appeals have found that 
Section 212(h) waivers are available to an alien seeking a 
waiver from inside our borders only if an alien files an 
application for adjustment of status concurrently with a 
waiver request, see Rivas v. Att’y Gen., 765 F.3d 1324, 1329–
30 (11th Cir. 2014), Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 891–94 
(5th Cir. 2011), Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 
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S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (outlining the categorical approach); 
Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the “‘formal categorical approach’ [used] in 
evaluating whether predicate convictions fall within the 
definition of ‘aggravated felony’”).  This is because 
regardless of whether Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction is 
a crime of violence, he did not receive a sentence “for which 
the term of imprisonment [was] at least one year.”  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
It is patent that the sentencing procedure used by the 
military judge provided no specific proof regarding the way 
in which the sentence was rendered as to each charge.  
Indeed,  
[I]t is the normal, traditional and well understood 
practice in the administration of military justice 
that ‘there shall be but a single sentence covering 
all the convictions on all the charges and 
specifications upon which the accused is found 
guilty, however separate and distinct may be the 
different offenses found, and however different 
may be the punishments called for by the 
offenses.’   
Jackson v. Taylor, 234 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1956) (quoting 
1 Winthrop, Military Law, 2d ed. § 615) (challenging the 
validity of a modified sentence and addressing the intricacies 
                                                                                                     
791–94 (7th Cir. 2007), we decline to address this question in 
a precedential opinion at this time.   
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of the military’s “gross sentence practice”), aff’d, 353 U.S. 
569 (1957).  When a general sentence is issued by a military 
tribunal, it is typically “conjectural what sentence the court-
martial would have imposed” for one charge in the absence of 
another.  Id. at 614.   
 So too here.  The record is devoid of any indication as 
to how or if the military judge apportioned the general 
sentence among Chavez-Alvarez’s various convictions.  Nor 
does the Manual for Courts-Martial contain any suggestion 
that a military judge should do so.   The assumptions made 
about Chavez-Alvarez’s general sentence are fundamentally 
incompatible with the Government’s burden of proof.  To the 
extent that any proof of Chavez-Alvarez’s sentence ever 
existed, it has apparently been lost to time.  In reinforcing that 
the burden of proof on the DHS to establish deportation is by 
“clear and convincing” evidence, the Supreme Court has 
noted that “uncertainties caused by the passage of time are 
likely to count in the alien’s favor.”  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. 
at 42.  The record here establishes only uncertainty—a factor 
that must redound to Chavez-Alvarez’s benefit.   
 The BIA and the Government provide independent 
justifications for finding Chavez-Alvarez removable, both of 
which fail. 
 Relying on a 60-plus-year-old BIA decision, the IJ 
reasoned that “[g]eneral sentences for multiple convictions 
have been interpreted by the BIA to apply to each conviction, 
to run concurrently.”  App’x 36 (citing Matter of S-, 3 I. & N. 
Dec. 460 (BIA 1948)).  Despite acknowledging Chavez-
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Alvarez’s argument that the Government’s interpretation was 
contrary to law and statute, the IJ reasoned that he was bound 
by Matter of S-.  Id.  The BIA similarly concluded that Matter 
of S- “support[ed] [the IJ’s] conclusion that the respondent’s 
general sentence applies to his conviction for sodomy by 
force.”  App’x 11 (citing as further support Martinez v. Nagle, 
53 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1931)). 
 In Matter of S-, the BIA addressed whether the 
relevant record established that an alien who had pleaded 
guilty in federal court to three counts of an indictment and 
received “a general sentence of 15 months imprisonment and 
a fine of $1 as to all the offenses” could be found to have 
“been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year or 
more” for violation of the specific federal statute that would 
subject the alien to deportation.  3 I. & N. Dec. at 461 
(deportation under the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act 
of 1909).  The BIA relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision 
that, according to the BIA, was “on all fours with the instant 
case”: Martinez v. Nagel, 53 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1931).  Id.  In 
doing so, the BIA applied the Ninth Circuit’s presumption of 
judicial regularity, specifically that: “The court might have 
sentenced the defendant on each count or it might impose one 
sentence upon both counts either upon a plea or verdict of 
guilty, and unless it specifically appears that the sentence was 
imposed upon one count only, the presumption obtains that it 
was a sentence upon both counts.”  Id. at 462 (quoting 
Martinez, 53 F.2d at 197). 
 The Ninth Circuit’s 1931 decision in Martinez says 
nothing about general sentencing in the military and is based 
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on concurrent sentencing in federal court.  For example, in 
addressing general sentences, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, 
“‘each sentence begins to run at once and all run 
concurrently, in the absence of some definite, specific 
provision that the sentences shall run consecutively, 
specifying the order of sequence.’”  Martinez, 53 F.2d at 197 
(quoting Puccinelli v. United States, 5 F.2d 6, 9 (9th Cir. 
1925)).  The rule from Martinez was most recently cited in 
1982 (and before the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)) as “a 
long-standing presumption, when the record is silent, in favor 
of concurrent sentences when the defendant has been found 
guilty on two counts and has been sentenced to imprisonment 
on one count and probation on the other.”  United States v. 
Rodriguez, 682 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).  Yet Martinez 
says nothing about general sentences in the military or how 
such sentences should be interpreted for removal purposes 
under the INA.  The Ninth Circuit’s presumption is simply 
inapplicable to the sentencing scheme at issue in this case. 
 On appeal, the Government concedes that Matter of S- 
has limited applicability.  Instead, the Government provides 
two separate arguments in support of the BIA’s decision, 
neither of which is persuasive.  
 First, the Government contends that if we agree with 
Chavez-Alvarez, “because the military employs general 
sentencing, no criminal alien service member who has been 
charged with more than [one] offense, at least one of which is 
an aggravated felony, can ever be ordered removed from the 
United States based on his commission of that crime.”  Att’y 
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Gen. Br. 27.  As a starting point, the Government is wrong 
that alien service members could never be removable if they 
receive a general sentence after being convicted of multiple 
offenses if one or more of the offenses are an aggravated 
felony.  We posit an example.  An alien service member is 
convicted of two offenses each of which has a maximum 
sentence of five years.  The military judge finds that each 
offense is subject to an independent sentence, and the service 
member receives a general sentence of 10 years.  One could 
conclude, barring some nuance not anticipated in this 
hypothetical, that the alien service member received a 
sentence of five years as to each offense.9  Such apportioning 
                                              
9 Sentencing procedures in courts-martial are governed 
by the Rules for Courts-Martial.  Rule 1002 provides that 
“[s]ubject to limitations in this Manual, the sentence to be 
adjudged is a matter within the discretion of the court-martial; 
except when a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed by 
the code, a court-martial may adjudge any punishment 
authorized in this Manual, including the maximum 
punishment or any lesser punishment, or may adjudge a 
sentence of no punishment.”  R.C.M. 1002, Manual for 
Courts-Martial, II-125.  In terms of the available punishment, 
when “the accused is found guilty of two or more offenses, 
the maximum authorized punishment may be imposed for 
each separate offense.”  R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C), Manual for 
Courts-Martial, II-128.  Unless otherwise provided in 
paragraph 5 of Part IV of the Manual, “offenses are not 
separate if each does not require proof of an element not 
required to prove the other.”  Id.  If the military judge 
determines that the offenses are not separate, “the maximum 
17 
 
would not require the kind of guesswork done by the 
Government in this case.  
 Even assuming we were sympathetic with the 
Government’s position on this policy issue, the Government 
essentially asks this Court to legislate a presumption in favor 
of removing alien military service members that is strikingly 
absent from the INA or relevant Supreme Court precedent.  
There are solutions to this potential dilemma, but they do not 
lie with the judiciary.  For example, the President can 
prescribe (through the Manual for Courts-Martial) that 
multiple sentences, as opposed to general sentences, be issued 
by a court-martial.  In addition, Congress has the authority to 
require multiple sentences more generally in the military or to 
amend the INA to add a special exception for evaluating the 
convictions of service members.  Such solutions are not for 
this Court to devise, however.  As such, the mere fact that 
“‘Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of 
a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to 
give effect to its plain meaning.’”  Lockhart v. United States, 
546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) (quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 
U.S. 151, 158 (1991)).  The definition of an aggravated 
                                                                                                     
punishment for those offenses shall be the maximum 
authorized punishment for the offense carrying the greatest 
maximum punishment.”  Id.  In a court-martial composed of a 
military judge alone, after all applicable and appropriate 
sentencing procedures, see R.C.M. 1001-1006, Manual for 
Courts-Martial, II-125–35, the sentence is announced by the 
military judge in the presence of all the parties.  R.C.M. 
1007(a), Manual for Courts-Martial, II-135. 
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felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), requires a conviction with 
a term of imprisonment of at least one year, and here we 
simply have insufficient evidence of such a conviction. 
 The Government’s second argument requires 
mathematic gymnastics and rank speculation.  Specifically, 
the Government argues that “given Alvarez’s 18-month 
sentence, the nature of the crimes committed, and the 
maximum allowable sentence for each offense, it cannot be 
seriously disputed that at least one year of the sentence is 
attributable to the forcible sodomy offense.”  Att’y Gen. Br. 
27.  As support, the Government postulated that Chavez-
Alvarez would receive a maximum sentence for each 
conviction and that he would live to 75 years of age, resulting 
in a “proportional breakdown” set out in a table.  Id. at 27–28 
& n.10.  The table provided: 
(1.5 year actual sentence * maximum sentence 
for charge A) / 86 year aggregate maximum 
sentence for all charges = proportional sentence 
for charge A. 
Conviction Maximum 
sentence 
Proportional 
Share of 
Sentence 
Art[] 107 false 
official 
statement 
5 years 1 month 
19 
 
Art 125 
forcible 
sodomy 
Life (75 years) 15 months, 3 
weeks 
Art 134 
adultery 
1 year 6 days 
Art 134 
indecent act 
5 years 1 month 
 
Id. at n.10.  This argument and post-hoc rationalization of 
Chavez-Alvarez’s sentence is so far removed from the 
relevant proof we may consider, Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 35–
36, and the clear and convincing evidence the Government 
must provide by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A), that it 
scarcely passes the laugh test. 
In sum, the BIA committed legal error in concluding 
that Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction was a crime “for 
which the term of imprisonment [was] at least one year.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
IV. 
We will grant Chavez-Alvarez’s petition and remand 
the case to the BIA for further proceedings. 
